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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 speaks in very general terms. It
governs every situation in which “scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact,” and provides that,
in that situation, “a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
1
opinion or otherwise . . . .” In 2000, following a trio of Supreme
Court cases interpreting Rule 702, the Rule was amended to include a
third requirement, in addition to the helpfulness of the testimony
and the qualifications of the witness: reliability. Under Rule 702 as
amended, a qualified witness may only provide expert testimony “if
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3)
the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts
2
of the case.”
In the wake of that trio—Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
3
4
5
Inc., General Electric Co. v. Joiner, and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael —
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FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added).
2
Id. (emphasis added).
3
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
4
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
5
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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we have all tended to focus our attention on the third and most
recent of these requirements for expert evidence: reliability. Literally
thousands of pages have been written about both the proper criteria
for evaluating the reliability of expert evidence and the institutional
6
competence of judges to evaluate scientific reliability. Moreover,
since Rule 702 is a rule of admissibility, commentators write and talk
about reliability primarily as a threshold question: is the evidence
reliable enough to be admissible? That question, naturally, is only
interesting in cases in which the expert evidence seems to be
comparatively unreliable—as that term is understood and applied—
and therefore potentially inadmissible. In each of this trilogy of
leading cases, for example, the expert evidence at issue was excluded
7
at trial as unreliable, and in each case the exclusion was affirmed.
Many have suggested that the problem of assessing reliability is
8
especially acute with respect to non-scientific expert evidence. At
6

A number of commentators have addressed this issue. See, e.g., Erica BeecherMonas, A Ray of Light for Judges Blinded by Science: Triers of Science and Intellectual Due
Process, 33 GA. L. REV. 1047 (1999); Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and
Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535 (1998); Judge Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for
Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 743 (1999); Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32
GA. L. REV. 699 (1998); David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at The
Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About
the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799 (1994) [hereinafter Faigman
et al., Check Your Crystal Ball]; David L. Faigman et al., How Good is Good Enough?:
Expert Evidence under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645 (2000)
[hereinafter Faigman et al., How Good is Good Enough]; Edward J. Imwinkelried,
Should the Courts Incorporate a Best Evidence Ruling into the Standard Determining the
Admissibility of Scientific Testimony?: Enough Is Enough Even When It Is Not the Best, 50
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19 (1999); Developments in the Law—Confronting the New Challenges
of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481 (1994).
7
See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 158 (upholding trial court’s exclusion of plaintiff’s
tire safety expert as unreliable); Joiner, 522 U.S. at 143 (finding trial court’s exclusion
of plaintiff’s expert evidence on causation within judge’s discretion); Daubert, 509
U.S. at 583-84 (vacating the lower court’s exclusion of plaintiff’s expert evidence and
establishing that “general acceptance” is no longer the proper standard for
admissibility); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir.
1995) (excluding plaintiff’s expert testimony on causation on remand from Supreme
Court).
8
Daubert offers a flexible set of guidelines for judges to examine when assessing
the reliability of scientific expert evidence—testability, error rate, the existence of
standards, peer review—and general acceptance. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95. Kumho
Tire holds that a judge may consider these criteria when evaluating nonscientific
expert evidence, but emphasizes that this “list of specific factors neither necessarily
nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case.” Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141. While
granting the trial judge “considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to
go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable,” the opinion
offers no concrete guidance on how to do this apart from using the Daubert factors
beyond noting that in some cases, “the relevant reliability concerns may focus upon
personal knowledge or experience.” Id. at 150, 152. A number of commentators
have begun to address the issue of how to evaluate non-scientific expert evidence.
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least compared to alternative forms of knowledge-production,
research science involves formalized methodological norms,
articulated standards, and conscious research design. By contrast,
many forms of potential expert knowledge—from the clinical
doctor’s diagnosis to the historian’s description to the tire safety
expert’s analysis—are based on experience, tacit knowledge, even
9
hunch.
Evaluating the reliability of knowledge not produced
through formal methods thus raises especially difficult questions. As
important as an examination of method, however, and much less
noted, is another dimension: the degree of certainty that the expert
posits in what she offers. One of the central problems with much
expert testimony introduced in court—both scientific and nonscientific alike—is that experts claim as matters of fact or probability
opinions that should be couched in more cautious terms, as
possibilities or hypotheses.
We believe that the monocular focus on issues of scientific
method and reliability has obscured some broader points; therefore,
in this Article we try to step back (gingerly) and take a broader view.
Instead of beginning with the problems of reliability, we start by
briefly detailing the array of informational issues facing a consumer
of expert evidence, thereby putting the attention-getting problems of
reliability into a broader context. We then attempt to review and
classify the full range of expert testimony, much of which is
unproblematic, AND some of which is problematic but routinely
admissible nonetheless. We offer first a brief taxonomy, an outline
with examples. We then develop our classification scheme by
exploring each kind of expert statement in more detail. In these
discussions, we purposefully do not distinguish between scientific
knowledge and other forms of knowledge, instead framing our
See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evaluating the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert
Testimony: A Partial Answer to the Questions Left Unresolved by Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 52 ME. L. REV. 19 (2000); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After
Daubert: Developing a Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of NonScientific Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2292-94 (1994); D. Michael Risinger,
Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic Science After Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2000); D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary
Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of Expertise for the Post-Kumho World, 31 SETON HALL
L. REV. 508 (2000) [hereinafter Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts].
9
Tacit knowledge and experience matter within science as well. See, e.g., H.M.
Collins, The TEA Set: Tacit Knowledge and Scientific Networks, in THE SCIENCE STUDIES
READER 95 (Mario Biagioli ed., 1999). In addition, some have argued that Daubert’s
conception of science is unrealistic and idealized. See, e.g., David S. Caudill,
Ethnography and the Idealized Accounts of Science in Law, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 269
(2002). Even granting both of these points, developing criteria for evaluating
reliability remains at least as difficult for nonscientific expert evidence as it is for
scientific expert evidence, and perhaps more so.
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taxonomy around specific kinds of statements and their functions.
Our taxonomy has four purposes. First, we want to emphasize
the extraordinary range of information that is presented in court by
expert witnesses. Some of this information is ‘scientific’ and some of
it is ‘non-scientific’; but often, whichever categories it falls in, it is
wholly unproblematic. Many if not most expert witnesses testify
without objection and present information that may be critical for
the factfinder but is not in dispute. Second, for many categories of
expert evidence, even when there may be some degree of controversy
or disagreement, there really is no Daubert or Kumho Tire problem.
For certain categories of expert information, a focus on the
credentials of the expert is generally sufficient, and courts need not
(and typically do not) make any additional elaborate inquiry into
validity.
Third, our taxonomy reminds us of the continuing
importance within the evaluation of expert testimony of more
mundane credibility issues than ‘reliability’ in the Daubert sense:
specifically, bias, competence, and lack of clarity. Finally, our
discussion reveals the sometimes overlooked importance of paying
attention not only to what the expert says, but to how she says it.
Often, whether testimony is based on scientific study or more casual
forms of observation, what makes an expert’s conclusion unreliable is
that it is expressed with a confidence not warranted by the evidence.
The clinical observations of a physician or an engineer or a mechanic
or a fingerprint examiner may be quite appropriate as the basis for
testimony, but the degree of certainty expressed by the witness should
reflect both knowledge and its limits, both what is known and what is
not.
II. THE GENERAL NATURE OF EXPERT EVIDENCE
A. The Task of Providing Expert Information: Doing and Telling
“Expert evidence” is a species of the genus “expert information.”
In everyday life, we rely on experts constantly—doctors, lawyers,
carpenters, mechanics. Most of the time we want them to do
things—set bones, write wills, build walls, fix brakes—not talk about
them. Most of us have learned the hard way that mechanics and
contractors (if not doctors) may have pleasing personalities and give
clear, plausible explanations, but do lousy work. Still, we usually want
these experts to tell us what they are doing, even if that is not their
main task, and sometimes that information is crucial since we, the
non-expert consumers, must make critical decisions. It is that
informative function that interests us here, since expert witnesses only
provide information, evidence; what they do in court is tell.
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Sometimes an expert might be able to answer a question
immediately, from existing knowledge: “Anthrax is a life-threatening
bacterial disease that cannot be transmitted directly from one
infected person to another.” For other questions, she may need to
collect additional information, in one or both of two categories: (1)
data about the particular case, ranging from the minimal (“let me take a
quick look”) to the extensive (collecting archival data on hiring and
compensation in a large company and then running a set of statistical
analyses); (2) general knowledge on the topic, which can mean anything
from checking a standard reference to an original scientific study that
adds to the body of general knowledge in the field and may have
value beyond the lawsuit. Whatever the scope of the work, the
structural significance is the same: The telling part of an expert’s
task—for an expert witness, this is the only job—often requires some
10
preliminary doing: study.
Testimony based on deliberate study is not the exclusive
preserve of expert witnesses. Lay investigators who set out to discover
what happened on a particular occasion may also testify to some of
what they find out. This category includes not only the prototypical
police and private investigators, but also any other witnesses—most
often, parties or their employees—who deliberately collect
information about significant past events. What makes studies by
expert witnesses different is the permissible scope of testimony
describing those studies. The lay investigator who “solves” a murder
may testify about the tracks he saw in the dust and the shell casings he
found in the defendant’s car, but he may not relate most of the
hearsay statements he heard when conducting interviews, and he may
not give his own interpretation of the evidence. By contrast, the
pathologist who testifies to the cause of death may freely rely on a
wide range of second-hand information in making up her mind, may
testify in detail to her opinions, and may be permitted to describe a
11
wide range of otherwise inadmissible evidence along the way.
10

In-court experiments provide the limiting case. While it may look like a form
of “doing,” such an experiment is really a form of “telling” that is gussied up to look
like “doing.” No experienced attorney would want an expert to perform an
“experiment” in court without being quite certain in advance about the outcome.
Strictly speaking, this sort of performance is not an experiment but a
“demonstration.” Its purpose is not to teach the expert anything at all, but to display
to the factfinder what the expert already knows.
11
See FED. R. EVID. 703. Rule 703 permits experts to base their opinions on facts
and data not admissible in evidence, so long as they are “of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject . . . .” An amendment to the Rule in 2000 restricts the extent to which the
expert may testify to the bases for her conclusions when those bases are inadmissible.
Such disclosure is permitted only when its probative value “substantially outweighs”
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Unlike a lay investigator, an expert may generate and testify to new
information that did not exist before by conducting tests (or
occasionally even studies) herself.
B. Issues for Consumers of Expert Information: Validity, Competence,
Clarity, and Bias
1. Validity
The most basic question about expert information is whether it
is within a valid category of expertise: Is there a field of knowledge
that has credible tools to produce valid answers to questions such as
this? Can astrologers determine personality characteristics from the
time and place of a person’s birth? Can forensic scientists determine
a person’s identity from bite marks? Can biologists determine
identity from analysis of DNA? In each case, the issue is not the
competence of the particular analysis but the legitimacy of the
discipline’s claim to be able to provide this sort of information. This
aspect of validity—field validity—is fundamental but usually
uncontroversial. It is important in court because it defines the
boundaries of permissible expert testimony—biologists will be
allowed to testify but astrologers will not—but most evidence that is
offered is well within the recognized borders. The debates preceding
and following Daubert have highlighted the importance of field
validity, and several accepted forms of expert testimony—from
psychiatric evaluations to handwriting identification—have been
12
challenged on this basis.
its prejudicial effect. Id. However, given the existence of hearsay exceptions for
statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment in Rule 803(4),
and for statements in learned treatises in Rule 803(18), it is clear that quite apart
from the limited admissibility now available under Rule 703, experts may still inform
the jury about a great many hearsay sources for their judgments.
12
See, e.g., United States v. Vallejo, No. 99-50762, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 7367, at
*29 (9th Cir. Jan. 16, 2001) (reversing the district court on its admission of expert
testimony on drug trafficking and its exclusion of expert testimony by defendant’s
school psychologist); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1295 (8th Cir.
1997) (reversing a successful trial level Daubert challenge to plaintiff’s psychiatric
testimony); United States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460 (4th Cir. 1995) (affirming district
court’s exclusion of expert testimony that defendant did not exhibit characteristics
of fixated pedophilia); United States v. Falcon, 245 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Fla. 2003)
(excluding defendant’s proffer of psychological expert testimony on the personality
disorders of a key government witness). The first case to scrutinize handwriting
identification evidence with care was United States v. Starzecpyzal, 880 F. Supp. 1027
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), in which the court thought the expertise failed Daubert but admitted
it anyway as nonscientific expert evidence (a move now prohibited by Kumho Tire).
Some recent cases have rejected handwriting identification expertise. See, e.g.,
United States v. Brewer, No. 01 CR 892, 2002 WL 596365 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2002);
United States v. Lewis, 220 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.W. Va. 2002); United States v.
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Moving down a level of abstraction takes us to a second aspect of
validity: method validity. Given that a discipline is accepted as a
legitimate category of expertise on a particular topic, are the
methods that were used in this instance capable of producing valid
answers? The present version of Rule 702, codifying Daubert and
Kumho Tire, makes method validity a prerequisite for expert evidence:
expert testimony is only admissible if it is “the product of reliable
13
principles and methods.”
In Daubert itself, for example, no one
doubted the field validity of epidemiology, but the lower courts went
on to hold nonetheless that the particular method used by the
plaintiff’s experts—reanalysis of data from published studies—was
14
not a valid basis for testimony by qualified epidemiologists. Method
validity addresses the specific techniques deployed by the expert: Is
PCR a valid procedure for comparing samples of DNA? Is differential
diagnosis a valid method to determine the cause of a disease?
15
Daubert, Kumho Tire, and Joiner all concern method validity. In their
wake, objections on this basis have become more common and more
16
successful, particularly so in civil cases.
In run-of-the-mill cases,
however, expert evidence continues to follow well-worn and wellSaelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. Alaska 2001). Academic debate about handwriting
identification evidence has been similarly vigorous. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger et
al., Brave New ‘Post-Daubert World’—A Reply to Professor Moenssens, 29 SETON HALL L.
REV. 405 (1998); D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational
Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification ‘Expertise’, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731
(1989); D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts:
Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21 (1996); see also
Andre A. Moenssens, Handwriting Identification Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 66
UMKC L. REV. 251 (1997). See generally Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The
History of Handwriting Identification Evidence and the Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87
VA. L. REV. 1723 (2001) (providing a history of handwriting identification).
13
FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added).
14
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 576 (S.D. Cal. 1989),
aff’d, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
15
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert, 509 U.S.
579 (1993).
16
See MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON ET AL., EXPERT TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL CIVIL
TRIALS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS (2000) (finding in a 1998 survey of federal judges
that fewer judges permitted all proffered expert evidence in their last civil trial than
had done so in 1991); Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting
Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases since the Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y &
L. 251, 269 (2000) (finding on the basis of an empirical study of district court
decisions that “since Daubert, judges have examined the reliability of expert evidence
more closely and have found more evidence unreliable as a result”); see also Lucinda
M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges are Using their Evidentiary
Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335 (1999); Steve
Leben, In Practice, Daubert Raised the Bar, 37 COURT REV. 37 (Fall 2000); Joseph
Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility of Differential Diagnosis Testimony to
Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of Adjective and Substantive Law, 64 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (2001).
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17

accepted paths.
Method validity and field validity are obviously linked—a field is
invalid to the extent that its methods fail to do what they claim—but
the distinction is important.
Field invalidity implies method
invalidity, but the converse is not the case. Few question the value of
medicine as a field, and few doubt that some medical doctors make
foolish medical claims, based on unsound, if not specious, methods.
One of the most difficult tasks for lay judges in evaluating expert
evidence is to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable
practices by qualified members of a legitimate discipline. One
solution is to pass the buck back to the expert field itself, and accept
the standards it imposes on itself; this is the logic behind the Frye
18
standard of “general acceptance” for novel scientific techniques.
However (ignoring for the moment other difficulties with Frye), this
dodge does not work when the validity of the field itself is in
19
question.
2. Competence
Assuming that expert information reflects sufficiently valid
methods within a legitimate field, we need to know whether a
particular statement is a competent example of its genre. This issue
has two components: (1) Qualifications: Does the expert at hand have
the knowledge and skill that are necessary to produce the
information? Rule 702 makes this a requirement: to testify as an
expert, a witness must be “qualified . . . by knowledge, skill,
20
experience, training, or education . . .”; and (2) Execution: Did the
expert (assuming she can ever do so) perform competently on this
occasion? Even a qualified expert working in a recognized and valid
17

The empirical data on the effects of Daubert are limited, but some findings
about how judges perceive Daubert are suggestive. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 16
(stating that though the number decreased between the years 1991 to 1998, in 1998,
59 percent of judges still allowed all of the expert evidence proffered in their last
civil trial); Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges
on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433 (finding
in a 1998 survey of state trial court judges that 59 percent thought that the intent of
Daubert was either not to change the threshold for admissibility for expert testimony,
or to lower it).
18
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
19
On Frye in general, see Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific
Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980)
(describing some of the problems with the Frye test). For analysis of the problems
with a general acceptance test when the field itself may be invalid, see Jennifer L.
Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13, 63
(2001). See also Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1078-79 (1998).
20
FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added).
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methodology can do an incompetent job in a particular case. Rule
21
702, following Kumho Tire, requires that expert testimony be “based
upon sufficient facts or data,” and that the expert have “applied the
22
principles and methods [she used] reliably to the facts of the case.”
Until recently, American courts were notoriously forgiving on
qualifications, and probably almost equally so on execution, as
preconditions for admissibility. The operating theory was that in
most cases these are issues that go to the weight of the evidence.
There are some indications that courts have become more exacting
in recent years, though the cases are by no means consistent on this
point.
3. Clarity
You can only make use of information to the extent that you
understand it. When the informant is an expert—someone whose
career is devoted to arcane information—the problem can be acute,
as most of us know from common experiences with builders,
accountants and computer technicians. Clarity is not generally an
important factor in determining the admissibility of expert testimony
in court. In theory, lack of clarity could be a basis for an objection to
expert evidence under Rule 403 because its “tendency to confuse”
23
substantially outweighs its probative value, or under Rule 702 on the
24
ground that the evidence is too confusing to “assist” the trier of fact.
In practice, these objections are unlikely to succeed—or even to be
made. Because clarity seems to have great influence on the
evaluation of experts by juries and judges, we are generally willing to
rely on the self-interest of the parties to produce clear expert
evidence in court. In fact, a special danger associated with expert
testimony is that the parties and their experts will sacrifice accuracy
for the sake of appealingly clear but erroneous or over-simplified
25
presentations.
4. Bias
If we understand what an expert tells us, and know that she has
correctly applied a valid method to the pertinent facts, our problems
are at an end. In most situations, however, we cannot know these
things directly for the simple and obvious reason that we ourselves
are not experts in the relevant field. Instead, we use various indirect
21
22
23
24
25

526 U.S. at 141.
FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added).
FED. R. EVID. 403.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1163-65.
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measures of the quality of expert information, of which the most
pervasive, in court and out, is bias. What is the first question that
comes to mind when a mechanic at a highway road stop tells you that
you need two new tires, immediately? As with clarity, bias is not a
common basis for excluding expert testimony. In our system, the
evaluation of bias is a core function and special prerogative of juries
as triers of fact; therefore we do not exclude witnesses who may be
biased, but allow juries to weigh that factor in judging their evidence.
Our practice for experts is, in this respect, basically the same as for lay
witnesses. We systematically neglect well-considered plans for the use
of unbiased (or at least, non-partisan) expert testimony as a
26
supplement to potentially biased party-sponsored expert evidence.
Conceptually, bias has three components: (1) Is the field biased?
Do chiropractors, as a group, always say that the problem is a
misalignment of the spinal column? This is not a common issue. In
an extreme case, evidence of this sort could conceivably be the basis
for an objection that evidence from such an expert is invalid—in the
terminology of this Article, that the area of knowledge lacks field
validity—or that experts trained in that discipline are unqualified to
testify. (2) Is this person biased across a range of cases? Is she an
expert who always says that the plaintiff had a pre-existing condition,
or that toxic exposure caused the disease? In extreme cases, this
could be an argument against admissibility on the theory that the
expert is unqualified; in practice this argument almost always “goes to
the weight” of the expert’s evidence. (3) Is the expert’s performance
biased? Does the expert have a grudge against this defendant, or,
more likely, was she paid a handsome fee to say what she said in this
case? That too is a type of bias that is considered appropriate as a
basis for discounting an expert’s evidence, but not for excluding it.
***
At this point, a note about vocabulary is in order. Daubert and
27
Rule 702 talk extensively about “reliability.”
In the sciences,
28
reliability is often used to mean “consistency” or “repeatability.” A
test that produces the same result on successive applications is said to
be reliable, while a test that produces accurate results is said to be
29
valid.
The Court in Daubert uses “reliability” instead to mean

26

Id. at 1187-1208 (describing both benefits and obstacles to use of neutral
experts).
27
See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
28
David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 83, 102 (2d ed. 2000).
29
Id.
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something closer to “validity” or “trustworthiness.” What the Daubert
Court calls “reliability” blends our categories of validity and
competence, focusing especially on method validity and competence of
execution. To be consistent with Daubert and Rule 702, in this Article
we too use reliability to mean “trustworthiness”: If evidence is reliable,
we can trust it, we can rely on it.
III. A TAXONOMY OF EXPERT INFORMATION
When an expert’s job is to inform, what sort of information do
we want? The scheme that follows is a first cut. The categories we list
are not entirely analytically distinct, and a single expert will typically
do more than one of these tasks in a given project. We do not divide
expert testimony by field, or even by methodological approach. Our
point, rather, is to note that there are several different types of
information that we commonly seek from experts—in court and
out—and to try to describe that range. In the scheme that follows,
categories of expert information are arranged, more or less, along a
rough continuum from specific “factual” bricks that the consumer
may use to build a wall, to comprehensive general “conclusions” that
the lay listener must accept or reject as a whole. We start with a
capsule form of the taxonomy—an outline with examples—and
proceed to a more detailed discussion in which we try apply the
general issues we have touched on—validity, competence, clarity, and
bias—and consider the factors that bear on the admissibility of such
expert information in court.

30

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9 (“We note that scientists typically distinguish
between ‘validity’ (does the principle support what it purports to show?) and
‘reliability’ (does application of the principle produce consistent results?) . . . . [O]ur
reference here is to evidentiary reliability—that is, trustworthiness.”) (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted).
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A. Capsule Form

1. Description:

(a) Observation:

“The brake shoes are worn to within 1
mm of the bracket.”
“This x-ray shows multiple fractures of
the tibia.”

(b) Translation:

“In English, that means ‘I agree.’”
“As used in this stock exchange,
‘5p@36’ means ‘I offer to sell 5000
shares of preferred stock at $36 per
share.’”
“The term ‘nick’ refers to a five dollar
bag of cocaine or crack.”

(c) Calculation:

“The total payments over the 10
year term of the loan, with compound
interest at 7% per annum, will come to
$789,566.”
“A racial disparity this large or larger
would occur by chance alone less often
than 1 time in 100,000.”
“Total indebtedness, as of 9/10/2001,
was $2,896,755.”

2. Instruction:

(a) Facts:

“Blood has a pH value of 7.4.”
“Mitochondrial DNA is transmitted
entirely from a mother to her offspring.”
“Most of the loss of eyewitness memory
occurs in the first few hours after an
observation.”
“Bendectin is not a teratogen.”
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“The customary treatment for
premature labor is bed rest and a
tocolytic agent.”
“Epidemiological study is the most
persuasive way to establish a correlation
between ingestion of a substance and a
disease.”

3. Assessment:

(a) Condition:
(diagnosis)

“Your chimney is unsafe.”
“The patient is suffering from
rheumatoid arthritis.”

(b) Causation:

“The skull fracture may have been
caused by a blow from a heavy object.”
“Tire failure was probably caused by a
defect in the fabrication of the tire.”
“The tumor was caused by exposure to
dioxin.”

(c) Consequences:

“The patient will be permanently
paralyzed from the fifth lumbar vertebra
down.”
“If current levels of phosphates are
maintained, all frog populations in the
basin will be extinct within ten years.”
“You need a new chimney.”

(prognosis)

(d) Identity:
(common source)
(e) Value:
(or quality)

“The latent fingerprints on the knife
came from the defendant’s right hand.”
“It’s a forgery.”
“The present value of the plaintiff’s
expected lifetime earnings before
the accident was approximately
$1.6 million.”
“This house has market value between
$375,000 and $405,000.”
“This play has literary merit.”
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B. Fuller Discussion
1. Description
Much information from experts is primarily descriptive rather
than evaluative. Expert testimony focuses heavily on opinions,
sometimes elaborate opinions, but, as Rule 702 recognizes, experts
31
may testify “otherwise.”
The boundary between description and
assessment is fuzzy, and expert opinions are frequently, perhaps
invariably, built into the foundations of their descriptive statements.
All the same, the distinction is meaningful and useful. In this Article
we discuss three types of descriptive statements: observation,
translation, and calculation.
Field validity is not a major concern for evaluating expert
information that is primarily descriptive, although it could be. A
specialty that claims to be able to observe people’s thoughts would
run into deep trouble. Questions of method validity frequently figure
in the background—in decisions on what to look for, for example (Xray the neck, or the entire spine?), or what to calculate (Is chi-square
an appropriate statistic test of the independence of the distributions
of two variables?), or how to calculate it (Can one use the SAS
statistical package to compute chi-squares?). And competence, of
course, is crucial.
(a) Observation
Much of what experts learn to do is see and hear things that the
rest of us miss. The degree and nature of the skill involved varies
greatly from one type of expertise to another, but the advantages that
many experts have in perception are well known, from umpires
(good ones) and coaches, to orchestra conductors, to optometrists.
An expert’s observation may be uncontroversial—the expertise
involved may consist entirely of identifying the right object (brake
shoe) and measuring it with the right tool (a caliper)—or it might
depend on an exercise of judgment that other experts might dispute
(“Strike!”). One way or another, the question that this sort of
expertise answers is: “What did you perceive—see, hear, feel or
smell?” In court, expert observations—describing pathologies or
injuries to people for example, or damage to structures—are often
crucial, either as the crux of expert testimony or as part of the
foundation for evaluative opinions. And these observations are
sometimes controversial since experts, like everybody else, may
disagree about what they see.
31

FED. R. EVID. 702.
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The distinction between observation and assessment is one of
degree. The nurse who says that a patient’s blood pressure was
135/85 is interpreting sensory information—what she saw on the
pressure gauge and heard on her stethoscope—not reporting it.
Moreover, her interpretation incorporates a host of unstated
assumptions about the tools she used and the procedure she
followed. A doctor who says that a patient is suffering from
rheumatoid arthritis is also interpreting information, but the range of
information is likely to be greater (multiple tests, reported and
observed symptoms, family history) and much of it probably consists
of second- and third-hand accounts. We classify the first statement
(blood pressure) as an expert observation, the second (arthritis) as an
assessment. Some cases may be harder to call, but the dividing line is
less important than the underlying issue: To what extent does the
expert integrate information about the particular case from a variety
of sources, rely on reports from others, and make complex analytic
judgments?
In general, the first thing we want to know about an expert
observation is the competence of the observer: How good is she at
this task? Since we do not usually have direct measures of skill, we
tend to rely on proxies: How good was her training? Does she use
accepted techniques in an apparently competent manner? Out of
court, we try to use experts who have, in our own experience,
provided accurate information in the past; failing that, we look for
those who are said to be accurate by friends and acquaintances, or
who are reputed to be accurate. In court, we count on testimony on
qualifications and on cross-examination to provide evidence on the
32
expert’s training and experience.
Bias, of course, may be as important as competence. The
chimney sweeper who tells you (as they all do) that there are ten-inch
cracks in your chimney, is probably also a contractor who rebuilds
chimneys. The key to minimizing bias, out of court, is to remove the
incentives to distort—for example, by consulting a diagnostician who
knows he will have no role in the treatment. In court, we neglect the
most effective method of minimizing bias—using non-partisan
experts—and rely instead on cross-examination and rebuttal to
33
expose it.
The primary foundational requirement for the admission of
observational expertise under existing rules is evidence that the
expert is “qualified,” which bears on her competence. On this issue,
32
33

See generally Gross, supra note 25, at 1158-62.
See id. at 1165-76, 1187-1211.
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the treatment of different sorts of experts is likely to diverge. If the
field has elaborate formal qualifications—in particular, if it requires
graduate or professional education, and/or certification—courts
typically accept these formal qualifications as sufficient evidence of
34
competence.
Most, perhaps all scientists fall into this category,
along with many non-scientists. On the other hand, if the skill is
based primarily or exclusively on “experience”—the harbor pilot or
the chicken sexer—courts may demand concrete evidence from past
35
practice that the expert can perform this task accurately.
By far the most effective way to minimize the danger of error in
observational evidence of any sort is to reproduce the observation.
For lay witnesses, we rarely have that luxury; for experts, we can often
ask another expert to do it again. If it matters enough, we have a
second doctor examine the X-rays, or a second lab repeat the test. In
litigation, this task may be performed by an expert for the side
opposed to the party that called the first expert. When this is
possible, the adversarial system probably performs quite well, on the
whole, in producing high quality evidence—provided that the
advocates for both sides have sufficient resources and motivation to
36
do a good job. This is a significant qualification.
The worst problems with expert descriptions occur in criminal
prosecutions. Most experts in criminal cases are state employees who
are called by prosecutors: police officers, medical examiners,
technicians at state crime laboratories, and so forth. Many of them
are inadequately trained, and some are unscrupulous.
Their
testimony is rarely subjected to review by defense experts; in many

34

See id. at 1158 n.139 (citing sources).
Some scholars have suggested that courts have implicitly used a ‘marketplace
test,’ inquiring whether the expert could make a living selling his professed
expertise. See Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball, supra note 6, at 1803-05; Saks,
supra note 19, at 1073-74.
36
Thus, for example, there are reports of widespread expert fraud in
comparatively small personal injury cases that settle on the basis of written reports
from plaintiffs’ experts, with minimal review from the defendants’ insurance
companies, and very likely none from their lawyers. See, e.g., William K. Rashbaum,
Three Officers Faked Reports, Police Say, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, at B1 (recounting that
three police officers were charged with falsifying accident reports along with several
other members of a fraud ring including individuals making false medical and
insurance claims); Jerry Urban, Metro Officials Say Fraudulent Injury Claims are Problem,
HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 11, 1997, at A15. We suspect that such fraud is far more difficult
and less common in cases that stand any chance of going to trial. But see Husband,
Wife Get 7 Years for Fake-Injury Schemes, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., July 17, 1992, at B5.
A husband and wife were sentenced after managing to win a $2.5 million malpractice
settlement and $900,000 in workers’ compensation for a fraudulent injury allegedly
arising from a back surgery. Id. The scam was revealed when the “injured” husband
was video taped by a private investigator walking his dog and climbing stairs. Id.
35
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cases, they are hardly even cross-examined by the inexperienced,
overworked, and underpaid court-appointed defense attorneys. Any
witness can make avoidable mistakes or lie, but an expert can make a
career of it. In recent years we have seen examples of this repeatedly
in criminal prosecutions across the United States: a pathologist who
testified to conducting hundreds of autopsies on bodies he never
37
touched, forensic scientists who made up findings in hundreds of
38
cases to suit the police and prosecutors, and crime labs that were
39
We have no way of knowing how
riddled with incompetence.
37

Texas pathologist Ralph Erdmann was eventually convicted of felonies relating
to autopsies that he botched and falsified. See, e.g., Richard L. Fricker, Grave Mistakes,
79 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1993, at 46 (describing Erdmann’s incompetence and quoting a
police seargent as stating that Erdman treated autopsies as if they were “kindergarten
classes or show and tell”); Richard L. Fricker, Pathologist’s Plea Adds to Turmoil:
Discovery of Possibly Hundreds of Faked Autopsies Helps Defense Challenges, 79 A.B.A. J.,
Mar. 1993, at 24 (describing Erdmann’s conviction and quoting attorney appointed
to investigate him as saying, “[i]f the prosecution theory was that death was caused by
a Martian death ray, then that was what Dr. Erdmann reported”); Roberto Suro,
Ripples of a Pathologist’s Misconduct in Graves and Courts of West Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
22, 1992, at 22 (describing intimations of a police cover-up of wrongdoing and
quoting investigator of Erdmann as saying, “We started digging up bodies and when
we were seven for seven we decided that in the interests of judicial economy we
didn’t have to go further to prove that this guy was a liar”).
38
The most notorious example is West Virginia serologist Fred Zain, who even
testified to tests his laboratory laced the equipment to perform. See generally In re
Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 738 S.E.2d 501,
503-04 (W. Va. 1993) (describing Zain’s misconduct and developing procedures and
standards for evaluating cases in which Zain’s testimony helped procure conviction);
JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION, AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 109-17 (2000) (describing in detail Zain’s
mishandling and creation of scientific evidence); Stephanie Martz, Judge’s Report
Closes Investigation of Zain, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 25, 1994, at 1D (reporting that
Zain was found to have fabricated blood test results in at least thirty-six cases); Sarah
Webster, Officials Revive Case Against Zain: Another Special Prosecutor Appointed to Pursue
Case, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Oct. 4, 1996, at 1C (describing incriminating evidence
against Zain said to include two coworkers who saw Zain fake data in nearly 100
cases).
39
See, e.g., Robert Tanner, Standards, Autonomy Sought for Crime Labs Mishandling of
Evidence; Mismanagement Cited, SEATTLE TIMES, July 7, 2003, at A1 (summarizing recent
problems with crime labs). Oklahoma City forensic scientist Joyce Gilchrist presents
another recent example. See, e.g., Memo Says Police Lab Manager Botched Evidence,
TULSA WORLD, May 2, 2001, at A8; Ed Timms & Diane Jennings, Concern Grows Over
Use of Flawed Evidence; Chemist’s Case Raises Fears of Problem’s Scope, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, May 13, 2001, at A43; Jim Yardley, Inquiry Focuses on Scientist Employed by
Prosecutors: Chemist Handled 5,000 Oklahoma Cases, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2001, at A14
(reporting that the Governor of Oklahoma ordered all felony cases in which Gilchrist
was involved to be re-examined); see also McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1218, 1222
(Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (reversing and remanding capital conviction on account of
Gilchrist’s poor lab work). There was also a year-and-a-half long investigation into
problems at the FBI crime lab. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE FBI LABORATORY: AN INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY
PRACTICES AND ALLEGED MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSIVES-RELATED AND OTHER CASES
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frequently similar problems go undetected, but by any accounting
40
they are by far the worst misuse of expertise in American courts.
This is an avoidable scandal. If we are going to rely on the adversary
system to guarantee competence and honesty in expert evidence we
must actually have an adversary process. When one side is absent, the
result may be disastrous.
(b) Translation
Almost all expert information involves some form of
“interpretation.” A radiologist who describes an X-ray as showing a
bone fracture is “interpreting” the X-ray; for that matter, a layperson
who says that the defendant “agreed” with the policeman is
“interpreting” the words the defendant spoke, or the nod of his head.
We use “translation” in a narrower sense, to refer to the restatement
in one system of symbolic communication (in American courts,
everyday English) of a message that was conveyed in a different
41
system of communication. In this case, the question for the expert
is some version of “What did she say?”
The archetypal “translation” is from one common language into
another. This is no doubt the common type of expert translation in
American courts, but other sorts of translation are also used with
some regularity. Perhaps the most controversial is expert evidence,
generally from a police officer, about the meaning of particular
words and phrases in some esoteric underworld community, typically
42
the world of drug dealers. Similar interpretive tasks, however, occur
in any context in which a comparatively small group of insiders in a

(1997); Richard A. Serrano, Misconduct Allegations Arise in FBI Lab Probe, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 1997, at A1. Most recently, a major scandal has been uncovered at the
Houston Police Department crime lab. See, e.g., James Kimberly, Independent Lab
Probe Given Push; City, County Officials Say Inquiry Would Help Rebuild Faith in System,
HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 30, 2003, at 21, available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/
ssistory. mpl/special/crimelab/188958.
40
See generally DWYER ET AL., supra note 38; Gary Taylor, Fake Evidence Becomes Real
Problem, NAT’L L. J., Oct. 9, 1995, at A1. An even more widespread problem may be
the biases that result from the close relationship between forensic experts and the
police and prosecution, and the fact that forensic experts frequently know in
advance what it is that the investigators hope that they will find. For a general
discussion of this issue, see D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho
Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and
Suggestion, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2002).
41
By contrast, Risinger uses “translation” in a broader sense to describe almost all
expert evaluations about the facts of the particular case that the trier of fact is asked
to accept on the basis of the expert’s authority. See Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts,
supra note 8 at 518-25.
42
See Phylis Skloot Bamberger, The Dangerous Expert Witness, 52 BROOK. L. REV.
855, 867 (1986).

2003

A PRELIMINARY TAXONOMY

159

profession or trade develops a specialized jargon for the issues they
deal with on a regular, repetitive basis: You may need an expert in the
diamond trade to tell you what a sentence from a diamond trader
43
means, or a pharmacist to interpret what your internist wrote on a
44
prescription form. As with expert observation, translation (by the
expert herself, or by another expert) is frequently a foundational
element of more evaluative expert testimony even when translation is
not a central or explicit task.
The main question for a translator is the same as for an expert
observer, competence: How good is she at her job? Other than
common intelligence, the main requirements for competence are
proficiency in the two systems of communication that need to be
made mutually intelligible; a Russian language interpreter in an
American court must be able to understand and communicate
effectively in both Russian and English. In addition, of course, a
biased translator can distort the message he transmits. As with expert
observers, the best check on mistranslation is replication by a second
translator who is not likely to share the weaknesses and biases of the
first.
The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize that translation is a
form of expert testimony, but nonetheless have a special provision for
interpreters who perform this function, Rule 604: “An interpreter is
subject to the provisions of these rules relating to qualification as an
expert and the administration of an oath or affirmation to make a
45
true translation.”
In practice, this means that interpreters who
provide evidence (as opposed to those who translate proceedings for
the benefit of non-English speaking participants) are treated
schizophrenically, depending on the context. Live testimony cannot
proceed if there is a dispute about the meaning of the spoken words.
Therefore, an interpreter who translates testimony from the witness
stand—unlike almost every other expert witness in an American
court—is selected by the judge, preferably from an official list of pre-

43

On the internally-created dispute resolution mechanisms within the diamond
industry, see Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
44
Sometimes obscure shorthand is used by insiders for the specific purpose of
making their views obscure to outsiders. For example, in a public defender’s office
where one of us worked as a student, “WPD” meant “white punk on dope,”—a
shorthand that facilitated messages, on the outside of file folders, such as: “D—WPD
V—WPD Will settle.” Similarly, we’re told that in some car dealerships the code
“ESO” on a form sent back from a mechanic to a “service representative” means
“Equipment Superior to Operator”—i.e., “The idiot customer is complaining
because he’s too stupid to operate the machine.”
45
FED. R. EVID. 604.
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qualified experts, takes the special oath provided by Rule 604 (if they
are in federal court) and provides (at least prima facie) authoritative
46
evidence on the meaning of the spoken words. The use of official
interpreters no doubt greatly reduces the danger of biased
translation. If the official certification program works as intended, it
may also help guarantee competence.
A different set of rules applies to an interpreter who translates
words that were spoken or written at some earlier time, as
memorialized in a document or an electronic recording. In that
situation, the translator is treated as an ordinary “language expert
[under Rule 702] who [takes] the stand under oath, and subject[s]
47
himself to cross-examination. Rule 604 is inapplicable.”
Since
immediate, authoritative translation is not a functional necessity
when the words are recorded, the usual rules for expert witnesses
apply, and competing experts may offer different interpretations of
48
statements in a foreign language. It is not clear to us how disputes
over the accuracy of translations of live testimony are handled, except
that the paucity of cases and commentary suggest that this is not a
problem that is frequently litigated.
The distinctive feature of the use of this type of expertise is the
emphasis on clarity. Because testimonial interpreters are imperative
to the ongoing functioning of the system of oral testimony in the face
of a language barrier, it is essential that they be comprehensible to
the participants as they perform their function. As a result, the Court
Interpreters Act includes a specific provision for the replacement of
49
an interpreter who does not “communicate effectively” —a problem
that in other expert contexts we let the adversaries sort out.
Translation from less well-organized systems of specialized
communication presents a different type of problem. When the
question is “What signs and words do drug dealers use to convey their
meaning without being understood by outsiders?” it is much harder
to find well-informed disinterested experts than when the question is
“What does this German sentence mean in English?” This can make
it harder to find unbiased interpreters, and harder to check on the
accuracy of a translation. The classic troublesome case is the police

46

Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1) (2003); United States v. Armijo,
5 F.3d 1229, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v Taren-Palma, 997 F.2d 525, 53132 (9th Cir. 1993).
47
Taren-Palma, 977 F.2d. at 532.
48
See, e.g., United States v. Ben-Shimon, 249 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (“If the
accuracy of the transcript is contested, competing transcripts may be submitted to
the jury.”); United States v. Chalarca, 95 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996).
49
28 U.S.C. § 1827(e)(1).
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officer who qualifies as an expert in some variety of underworld
50
jargon. In that situation, the problem is frequently magnified by the
fact that the officer-expert, who has an obvious interest in the
outcome of the case, also testifies as a lay witness to critical acts by the
criminal defendant or by others. When that happens, the process of
qualifying the officer as an expert—both the imprimatur given by the
court and the character evidence on which it is based—may
51
improperly bolster the officer’s lay testimony. And, of course, this
takes place in the presentation of the prosecution’s case in a criminal
trial, where our concern for accuracy ought to be at its highest.
(c) Calculation
For this type of expertise, the question to the expert is some
variant of “What does it add up to?” Totaling up the grocery bill,
even if you have to add sales tax, hardly requires an expert, but some
tasks that involve nothing more than a complex set of arithmetic
calculations (preparing a tax return) may benefit from an expert’s
help. If the job is big enough and complicated enough (calculating
the indebtedness of a substantial company), or involves more
sophisticated and difficult mathematical operations (calculating
inferential statistics, or the force generated by a falling object) expert
help is essential for most of us in any context, and always in court
where the trier of fact is a lay jury or judge. In that situation, an
expert who testifies to calculations will usually also explain what this
type of calculation means, a separate task that we discuss under the
heading “instruction.”
Calculation, like translation, is a task of making sense of
information that is already available. It can be done by any qualified
expert once the data exist. As with observation and translation, the
central issue is the competence of the calculator—a question that
50

See United States v. Barnett, Nos. 02-4561, 02-4732, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6953,
at *3-5 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 2003) (describing how a special agent was permitted to
testify as an expert witness with regard to drug code); United States v. Ceballos, 302
F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2002) (recounting that the government presented two agents
as experts on drug code language who testified as to the content of several taped
conversations played for the jury); United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 53 (2nd
Cir. 2001) (allowing an agent to serve as a dual witness testifying as a case agent and
as an expert on drug code); United States v. Evans, 272 F.3d 1069, 1096 (8th Cir.
2001) (upholding the admittance of a sergeant’s testimony regarding prostitution,
including jargon); Bamberger, supra note 42.
51
See Dukagjini, 326 F.3d at 53-56; Bamberger, supra note 42, at 866-69 (discussing
United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1984)). Though courts express concern
about expert evidence bolstering the lay evidence, the inverse is also possible: if the
factfinder believes the lay witness’s eyewitness account, she may be more inclined to
trust her expert judgment as well.
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usually can be routinely answered by reference to her training and
experience. In court, the qualifications of the expert are the only
requirement for admissibility of this sort of expertise; mathematics
itself is correctly considered to be universally reliable.
Strictly speaking, calculation itself is absolutely predictable;
mathematical operations leave no room for ambiguity. Experts do
disagree, however, on antecedent questions: what to count and how to
do so. As the assumptions that are built into the process become
more complex and debatable, the task may slip from “calculation” to
“assessment.” As we have drawn the line in this Article, determining
the indebtedness of a company is near the borderline. We classify it,
perhaps arbitrarily, as a “calculation,” although, as we all learned
from the Enron and Arthur Andersen scandals, there are more ways
than one to make the many underlying judgments on how to
categorize various possible liabilities and assets. On the other hand,
we describe the task of estimating the present value of a person’s
lifetime earnings if he had survived an accident as an “assessment.”
The difference is not so much that this task is more complex or
controversial than calculating indebtedness, but that it requires
integrating information on, and making assumptions about, more
disparate issues—productive life span, possible career paths, future
employment trends and wage rates, productivity and inflation in the
economy, and so forth. As with observation, the location of the
boundary line between the more descriptive task of “calculation” and
the more analytic task of “assessment” is not crucial, as long as we
realize that some calculations are based in part on controversial
assumptions; that many assessments have calculations embedded in
them; and that there are close cases that are hard to call.
As calculation shades into assessment, questions of method and
bias become increasingly salient. The question may be not so much
what the indebtedness of Enron adds up to, but what the expert
means by “indebtedness.” If both sides have access to competent
experts, legal disputes that involve calculations are likely to focus on
these choices and on the expert assessments on which they are based,
or on the accuracy of the underlying data, rather than on the
mathematical calculations themselves. Since the results of the
mathematical operations are determinate, there should be no more
room to dispute the calculation that produces an estimate of the
expected lifetime earning of a deceased plaintiff than to dispute the
arithmetic (as opposed to the items) on a tab in a restaurant. If there
is a dispute, replication (in a restaurant or in court) is a perfect check
on mathematical accuracy.
In theory, calculations and their
underlying assumptions can always be teased apart, the assumptions
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spelled out and separated from the calculations that follow. In
practice this may make the information too dense to absorb—we do
not really want to know how and why our accountant calculated the
tax as she did—and in any case it often is not done.
2. Instruction
Experts, to state the obvious, educate—they provide lay people
with useful information. In court, the only function of an expert
witness (or for that matter, any witness) is to educate, in this very
general sense: to supply information that helps the trier of fact make
52
decisions.
We focus here on a particular kind of education—
“instruction”—by which we mean general information about some
common issue or phenomenon (“Inadequate drainage can cause
ground water to undermine a foundation”) rather than specific
information about a particular problem or case (“The wall collapsed
because of inadequate drainage at its base”). Instruction answers
such questions as “What do experts know about that topic?” and
“How do things like that work?”
Instruction provides background knowledge but not the case53
specific answers. An expert witness who gives purely instructional
testimony in a trial can literally repeat the same performance in a
different courtroom with a different cast of characters, in another
case that raises a parallel issue with different specific facts.
Instructional testimony may lead to an inference that suggests or even
requires a specific decision in a given case, but it is not itself
information about any particular case. The statement “Bendectin is
not a teratogen”—once controversial, now no longer so—is an
example of instruction: it is a general empirical claim. By contrast,
the statement, “Ingestion of Bendectin by the plaintiff mother did
not cause this limb defect in her offspring,” is no longer instruction.
It follows logically from the general instructional statement, if true;
but it also may be true even if that general statement is not. In any
case, the second assertion is a claim about the specific events involved

52

For a detailed analysis of experts as educators, see Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S.
Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education, 87 NW. U. L. REV.
1131 (1993).
53
Edward Imwinkelried has made a similar distinction between what he terms
the expert’s major and minor premises: “The major premise is a principle,
procedure, or explanatory theory derived by the inductive, scientific technique. The
[expert] applies that major premise to the facts of the case” and these specific facts
are the witness’s minor premise. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The “Bases” of Expert
Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1988);
see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Educational Significance of the Syllogistic Structure of
Expert Testimony, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1148 (1993).
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in the litigation—a type of statement that we classify and discuss as an
assessment of causation.
As usual, effort can make the boundaries fuzzy. Consider, for
example, the archetypal early twentieth-century hypothetical question
in which the lawyer would ask an expert for his opinion about the
cause of death of a “hypothetical person.” In form, the lawyer would
ask for an opinion on the cause of death of anybody in like
circumstances, but the actual question (which sometimes went on for
pages) would incorporate a whole series of particular facts that
happened to be in evidence in the case at hand, and the expert
would provide an opinion assuming these many ostensibly
54
hypothetical facts to be true.
Strictly speaking, the testimony is
framed in general non-case-specific terms and, therefore, fits our
definition of “instruction.” But the effect, of course, if we look past
the formal structure of the testimony to its substance, is an extremely
fact-specific opinion that is best described as an “assessment.”
Whatever the dividing line between instruction and assessment,
most experts—and certainly most expert witnesses—go back and
forth across it and provide both types of information. This need not
be the case. Eyewitness identification experts, for example, if
permitted at all, are typically allowed to provide instruction only.
They may testify, for example, that in general cross-racial
identification is more likely to be erroneous than intra-racial
identifications, or that eyewitness confidence is not generally a good
predictor of eyewitness accuracy.
But case-specific testimony
evaluating the merits of a particular eyewitness’s identification, if
offered, would typically be excluded as an invasion of the province of
55
the jury.
Most experts, however, do provide case-specific
assessments, and usually incorporate instruction into that testimony,
to make their conclusions both more comprehensible and more
persuasive.
In this Article we discuss two different kinds of instructional
statements: claims about matters of fact in the physical world, and
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The case of Treadwell v. Nickel, 228 P. 25 (Cal. 1924), describes an extreme
example: an eighty-three page hypothetical question, followed by a fourteen page
objection.
55
Some judges believe that even permitting expert testimony on the lack of
relationship between confidence and accuracy invades the province of the jury. In
Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327, 338 (Del. 2003), the trial court rejected the portion of
the
eyewitness
identification
expert’s
testimony
dealing
with
the
confidence/accuracy relationship “because such opinion would amount to a
comment on the veracity of the witnesses who testified and thus would invade the
province of the jury.” The Delaware Supreme Court found the exclusion to be error,
albeit harmless. Id.
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statements about social norms—customs, common practices, ethical
and professional standards, research methodologies.
In both
contexts the expert gives her views on the state of the world—
instruction on norms, in this sense, is factual rather than normative—
but the purposes to which each kind of instruction are put in court
are quite different. Much (though by no means all) factual
instruction is uncontested, and typically, even when controversial, it is
not a central issue in a case but rather serves as the background for
an assessment. Occasionally, however, a disputed general factual
proposition—in the classic case, “Bendectin is a human teratogen”—
is an essential element of a claim. By contrast, in malpractice claims
against professionals—lawyers, accountants, psychotherapists, and
especially doctors—instructional opinions about norms—the
professional standard of care for the conduct at issue—are often at
the heart of the case. As we shall see, these differences in nature and
purpose have implications for the admissibility of these two types of
instructional testimony.
(a) Facts
If you want to know an esoteric fact, you ask an expert, or—
much the same thing—check a book or an article written by one.
Most of the time we can rely on the information we get in this
manner because the answer, although news to us, is well-known and
uncontroversial among those who specialize in the area. This can be
true for information at any level of generality, from the universal
(“the speed of light in vacuum is 299,792,458 meters per second”) to
the highly particular (“73% of the respondents on this survey did not
know the name of either of their United States senators”).
In court, much expert information of this sort could be
presented without testimony by any witness.
Frequently, the
statements at issue—that human blood has a pH of 7.4, for example,
or that every person (except an identical twin or a clone) has a
unique DNA sequence—are suitable subjects for judicial notice
because they are not open to reasonable dispute and are “capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
56
cannot reasonably be questioned.” In practice, such information is
generally introduced in the course of expert testimony, in part
because the statements accompany other information provided by
the expert that could not properly be judicially noticed, and in part
because a well-prepared expert witness is more likely than the judge
to present the information in a manner that is helpful to the side that
56
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called her.
A layperson cannot know in advance which propositions are not
in dispute in medicine or physics or genetics. Out of court, we can
guard against being misled (as usual) by asking more than one
expert, or consulting more than one reference, or relying on a
source—the United States Census Bureau, for example—whose
authority we do not doubt. In court, the adversarial process defines
what is in dispute, and undeniable expert facts are likely to form part
of the uncontested background for the assessments that are
contested. The parties may fight about whether a substance found in
the defendant’s possession was cocaine, but they are not likely to
fight about the chemical make-up of cocaine itself. They might
disagree about whether a DNA-typing test was done correctly in the
particular case, or about how to interpret the evidentiary significance
of finding the defendant’s DNA at the crime scene, but they are
unlikely to do battle over the general premise that apart from
identical twins, a person’s DNA genome is unique. On background
issues of that sort, there is no debate about factual accuracy, and
hence no question of reliability or admissibility. There is still room
for bias, of course, in the selection and organization of the material.
A testifying expert (like any teacher) chooses what to present from a
large array of possible pieces of information; she may select the
background facts most useful to her party’s case and omit other
information that is less helpful to her client. This form of bias is
almost invariably addressed by cross-examination and rebuttal
testimony rather than exclusion. Assuming the opposing party is
motivated and prepared, these may well be adequate mechanisms for
checking partisan impulses to provide partial information.
As we move away from well known facts about which there is
little or no disagreement, matters become more complicated. In
theory, this is a problem that can be addressed: after more tests, more
study, and more examination, we might someday reach answers that,
if not wholly conclusive, may at least achieve widespread consensus.
For a straightforward issue—the population of Detroit in 2000—a
single, well-executed study (the decennial census), despite its
imperfections, may provide as good an answer as we will ever have.
But for difficult and complex questions (the origin of HIV; the
structure of quarks) the process is likely to be complicated and
uncertain, and even many comparatively easy issues are never
addressed, or the studies are not complete when we need them.
Whether because of the complexity of the issue or the paucity of the
data (or both), at any point in time, a general factual question may
have no clear answer. Knowledgeable people may disagree on what
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the answer is, or whether it is known, or even whether the question is
answerable. And even if there is a reasonably clear answer out there
somewhere, it may be no mean feat to find it. None of us can absorb
even a tiny fraction of the general knowledge that exists in our
extremely complex culture. We have no choice but to rely on
experts, those who know the issue best—which merely pushes the
problem back a step, to the identification of the most knowledgeable
experts to rely on.
How do we determine matters of instructional fact outside of the
courtroom? On routine issues, even debatable ones—and often on
big ones as well—we do not invest a lot of energy in screening expert
instruction. We look in well-known sources or ones we are familiar
with (the Internet, the New York Times), we ask experts we have used
before who are referred to us by friends and acquaintances, or we see
what highly-credentialed experts have to say. If it really matters,
however—if a lot of money, or the future of an institution, or
someone’s life or health is at stake—we increase our search costs. We
spend time and energy to identify leading experts and to learn what
they think about the matter.
What exactly are we searching for? Since we cannot identify
accurate expert instruction directly, we look for the best available
proxy: the consensus of well-informed experts in the field. Of course
there may not be a consensus, and if there is, it may be out-of-date or
just plain wrong. But figuring out the consensus viewpoint, if there is
one, is the starting point of any well-conducted inquiry into general
facts outside of litigation; more often than not, it is the ending point
as well.
In the context of litigation, identifying a consensus among
experts in court can be very hard. The expert’s credentials are not
much help. An imperfect proxy for knowledge in the best of
circumstances, credentials lose nearly all of whatever value they may
have when expert witnesses are chosen by the parties, from among
those who will say what the parties want to hear, in part precisely
57
because of their seemingly impressive credentials.
Worse, the
57

See Gross, supra note 25, at 1134. With most witnesses, parties are constrained
by circumstances: they have no choice but to use those who, because of their physical
relationship to the facts, have uniquely valuable information. (The personal
knowledge rule operates as a proxy for information quality, supplemented by
extensive (though not necessarily effective) mechanisms for testing witness credibility
to weed out percipient but unreliable observers.) In the context of factual
instruction, where the issues are ones of general knowledge, parties are not limited
by the happenstance of percipient witnesses. Since they can call any qualified expert
who is willing to cooperate, they can, in principle, get the best available evidence in
every case. In practice, their dominant incentive is to get the most useful expert
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parties who call expert witnesses have no common interest in
identifying a consensus among experts. On the contrary, if there is
any room at all for a dispute among experts, one side or both may
have an interest in obscuring the extent of general agreement within
the field and creating the appearance of an active dispute when there
is none. The experts the parties call may take positions that are at
best outliers within their own specialties but sound perfectly plausible
to outsiders. If the factfinder is a jury, it may not even have the power
to put questions to the party experts, much less seek another opinion
58
or investigate another source. If the plaintiff calls an expert who
testifies that silicone gel breast implants are known to cause autoimmune diseases, and the defendant calls an expert who testifies that
there is no evidence that these devices produce that effect, the
factfinder is in no position to judge which statement reflects a
consensus in the field, if one exists, and which statement is
considered unlikely or simply false. In any other contexts, the answer
would be to check with experts who are not chosen by and identified
with those parties whose interests are directly at stake—a panel
assembled by the NIH rather than researchers hired by the
pharmaceutical company whose product is being studied. That
procedure is available in court under Federal Rule of Evidence 706,
but, as we have mentioned, it is rarely used, and almost never in
routine cases.
If credentials do not help much, and unbiased expertise is not
sought, what legal tools are left to address conflicting expert claims
about general factual propositions? We can exclude the evidence, or
we can do our best to make use of what we get. In practice, we rely
on the second sort of remedy more often than the first.
Daubert and its progeny—including the post-Daubert version of
Rule 702—require courts to assess the validity of this sort of expert
evidence. But how? By what standard? If we are not concerned
about the validity of the field (if we are dealing with medicine, for
example, and not astrology), a consensus of informed experts about
the matter of general fact should certainly be sufficient to justify
admission, but is probably too much to require. On one hand, if the
cause of a phenomenon is unknown—and generally agreed to be
unknown—this requirement would prevent the jury from getting any
meaningful expert assistance on causation, since the only thing an
expert witness could testify to is the consensus that experts do not
testimony to support their position, not the most accurate.
58
Some courts permit jurors to ask questions of witnesses through the judge, but
this varies by jurisdiction and the temperament of the judge. Judges can, of course,
question witnesses.
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know. On the other hand, for the large array of issues on which
experts disagree on whether there is a consensus, or on what the
consensus is, this rule would be impossible to administer. Could
judges possibly determine the existence of an expert consensus, item
for item, as a precondition to permitting any expert witness to make
general factual claims? The difficulties of applying Frye pale by
comparison.
A judge could demand a lesser degree of agreement as
condition for expert instruction. A mild version of this inquiry into
the consensus of the field seems to us to be a reasonable requirement
for expert instruction. Because the judge’s role is merely to decide
whether the information may be considered at all, the test should be
whether other experts in the field generally agree that the factual
claim is plausible. This is a different kind of agreement than that
demanded by Frye (“general acceptance” of the method or
technique), and it does not require any level of agreement on the
ultimate truth of any asserted fact. The focus, rather, is on the
legitimacy of the factual claim: is it (at a minimum) considered a
debatable point among those who know best?
Rule 702 speaks to the issue of instructional testimony only
59
obliquely. This category of testimony does not fit neatly into the
Rule’s structure, which assumes that expert testimony will apply “to
60
the facts of the case.” Nonetheless, Rule 702 can be interpreted to
impose a reliability requirement on general factual instruction, as for
all expert testimony. To the extent that courts do scrutinize scientific
testimony about general facts, we suspect that their inquiry focuses on
the kind of consensus we have described: the degree of plausibility of
the factual proposition within the witness’s field. In general,
however, the courts make no such inquiry. They simply require that
an expert be “qualified,” and then—except in a small group of
unusual but important cases—allow them to make a wide range of
general factual claims within their fields of expertise. Once a witness
has been permitted to testify as an expert under Rule 702, judges
usually leave the task of correcting and explaining their instructional
statements to the opposing parties and the expert witnesses they call.
Occasionally, a party may call an expert witness who says things
that are simply bizarre. This seems to happen most often in criminal
cases, where resources and standards of practice—especially on the
defense side—are sometimes abysmally low. In the 1980s, for
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FED. R. EVID. 702. Rule 702 was revised in 2000 in the wake of Daubert and
Kumho Tire to emphasize the reliability requirement for expert testimony.
60
Id.
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example, an anthropologist named Louise Robbins was allowed to
testify for the prosecution in several cases that it is possible to identify
a person from nothing more than a shoe print—the wearer, not the
61
shoe.
The only explanation is incompetence by the judges, the
defense attorneys, or both. (Her testimony was also excluded several
times. Even so, the fact that she did testify repeatedly—indeed, that
prosecutors even considered using her—is some measure of what’s
not considered a problem.) Usually, however, it is not the statement
itself that is implausible but the confidence with which it is uttered.
The problem is not the assertion that exposure to asbestos might
cause colon cancer, but the claim that it does.
On reflection, it appears that the level of certainty that a witness
attaches to a statement is likely to be the dominant problem for this
type of expert testimony. If an expert testifies, for example, that a
scientific study published in a peer-reviewed journal found that
ephedra had a teratogenic effect on mice when ingested at a certain
dose, this is as unproblematic as instructional testimony can be; the
expert is reporting a fact that can easily be checked. The expert
might then go on to testify, however, on the basis of that study
(perhaps in conjunction with other information, perhaps not), that
in her opinion ephedra is a human teratogen. Although phrased as
an “opinion” this second claim is still “instruction” rather than
“assessment,” since the conclusion remains general rather than casespecific. But there is much more reason to be concerned about
reliability at this higher level of generality. The study might be biased
or poorly-conceived, and even if it is flawless, it might not be a
sufficient basis for the expert’s general conclusion. Even so, the issue
is not so much the possible causal link the expert draws between
ephedra and birth defects, but her confidence in the existence of
that link. Few would quarrel with the witness if she had said that
ephedra “might” be a human teratogen, or even perhaps that “there
is a substantial risk” that it causes birth defects. The problem
emerges as she moves up the ladder from possible to probable, to very
likely, to is.
In the usual case, however, testimony is not excluded because a
witness is too certain or too uncertain. Normally, a witness’s level of
confidence is grist for the adversarial mill: the jury considers it in
evaluating the witness’s credibility, taking into account any in-roads
made in cross-examination, inconsistent evidence on rebuttal, and
arguments by counsel. Lots of witnesses are excessively self-assured;
61

See Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need
for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 439, 457-62 (1997)
(discussing Louise Robbins’s so-called expertise).
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many are simply wrong. We do not exclude an eyewitness who says
she is 100% certain that she can identify the defendant as the man
she saw from fifty feet, across a dark parking lot, for five seconds; we
impeach her. By the same token, we do not generally exclude
testimony from a doctor who says that he knows that regular exercise
decreases the risk of coronary heart disease. Like the eyewitness,
even if this expert is correct on the ultimate issue, she may not be
entitled to speak with the level of confidence that she expresses; like
the eyewitness, the jury will usually be allowed to hear her testimony,
and the opposing party will have a chance to try to get her to weaken
or qualify it, or to make it seem unreasonable.
There are, however, several important differences between the
lay eyewitness and the expert providing fact instruction. The
structural incentives for the expert to distort and overstate are
significantly greater.
The pressure of litigation, the partisan
identification an expert may develop over time, and the fact that the
expert receives payment may spur even a well-intentioned expert to
make instructional inferences in a stronger form than a fair-minded
reading of the evidence supports. Moreover, it may be precisely the
degree of overstatement that makes otherwise plausible testimony
unreliable.
When does a general factual proposition become so
unreasonable that it may be excluded entirely from evidence? In
some tort cases a general factual proposition is a necessary step to
establish causation, and substantive tort law requires expert testimony
on causation that is phrased in terms of a specified level of
confidence. In that situation the admissibility of expert instructional
testimony on a question of general fact is outcome determinative,
and detailed attention by the parties and the court is worth the
62
candle. For example, in Joiner, the plaintiff claimed that he was
exposed to PCBs by the defendant, and that the exposure caused the
small cell lung cancer from which he suffered. The district court
excluded the plaintiff’s proffered expert testimony on causation
because “the court is not persuaded by a preponderance of proof that
the studies support the ‘knowledge’ the experts purport to have (i.e.,
that PCBs, ‘to a ‘reasonable degree of medical certainty,’’ promote
63
small cell lung cancer in humans).” And, since the plaintiff was now
without this necessary testimony—“to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty”—the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary
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522 U.S. 136 (1997).
Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (internal
citation omitted).
63
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judgment and dismissed the claim.
In Joiner, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s
64
ruling.
The main issue in Joiner was the standard of review on
appeal of a ruling excluding evidence under Rule 702. The Supreme
Court concluded that “abuse of discretion is the proper standard by
which to review a district court’s decision to admit or exclude
scientific evidence,” and that “the District Court did not abuse its
65
discretion in excluding . . . [the plaintiff’s expert] testimony.”
Under Joiner, other district courts could reach the opposite
conclusion and admit identical expert testimony on the identical
issue of general causation. This is a disturbing rule. The trial court’s
conclusion in Joiner that “there is simply too great an analytical gap
between the data and the opinion” is really a substantive judgment
that the plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient masquerading as a
procedural judgment that it is inadmissible. It may make perfect
sense to give trial courts the authority to decide this issue—but why
call it an evidentiary ruling, all but eliminate appellate oversight, and
create a situation in which the very evidence that is legally sufficient
to prove a fact before Judge Monday is excluded entirely by Judge
Friday?
There are bounds on the discretion conferred by Joiner. Courts
do not like to look (or to be) foolish. If a general proposition
becomes widely accepted in a respected community of experts, courts
usually fall in line, if sometimes after an uncomfortable gap. In the
first part of the twentieth century, most physicians believed that a
single traumatic blow could cause a malignant tumor, but by 1940
there was a medical consensus rejecting this theory. It had an
afterlife of sorts, however, in court: it was presented with approval in
66
at least a few cases for another fifteen or twenty years —but
apparently not beyond the early 1960s. Today, it would be rejected
out of hand.
We have seen this process repeatedly in the past several decades
in mass toxic tort litigation. In a typical mass tort situation, many
separate plaintiffs make the identical argument on general causation,
the issue is subject to systematic study and replication, and vast
amounts of money are at stake. Given these circumstances, the
general causal relationship between the substance and the pathology
at issue is studied repeatedly, and eventually everybody (or almost
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Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (affirming the district court’s exclusion and reversing a
decision by the Eleventh Circuit).
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522 U.S. at 146-47.
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Gross, supra note 25, at 1184 n.217.
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everybody) agrees that there is or is not a causal connection. In
Daubert, for example, the plaintiff’s experts were prepared to testify in
1989 “that to within a reasonable degree of certainty Bendectin is a
67
teratogen,” —testimony that in form is very similar to that offered in
Joiner. But the context was different. By 1989, thirty separate
epidemiological studies had failed to find a significant relationship
68
between Bendectin and birth defects.
Given that body of
knowledge, the proposition that Bendectin does not cause birth
69
defects—like the claims that asbestosis causes lung cancer and that
70
silicone-gel breast implants do not cause systemic disease —was no
longer open to debate. One way or another, courts now treat these
factual statements as rules of law.
Courts do not generally have problems with the expert
instruction that sticks close to observable facts. They will not hesitate
to admit testimony from a harbor pilot who testifies that he has seen
several twelve-meter yachts pass under a particular bridge at high
tide, or from a doctor who testifies that he has seen several patients
with this sort of injury relearn to walk. Whether we trust doctors
more than pilots (or less), the structure of the testimony is the same:
“I’ve seen it happen; draw your own conclusions.” For factual
generalizations, however, courts are likely to discriminate between
fields in a manner that reflects their assessment of the strength of the
scientific basis for the discipline. The harbor pilot will be allowed to
testify about the height of tides in the harbor he works in, but not
about the causes of unusual tidal patterns. Epidemiological evidence
that asbestos causes lung cancer is viewed as conclusive, but testimony
from a questioned document examiner that forgeries can always be
detected will meet with skepticism, and testimony from an astrologer
that Virgos have controlling personalities would be excluded if it
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Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 574 (emphasis added).
Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1129.
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See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Ayers, ___U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. 1210, 1222 (2003)
(“[T]here is an undisputed relationship between exposure to asbestos sufficient to
cause asbestosis, and asbestos-related cancer.”).
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See, e.g., Meister v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 267 F.3d 1123, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(“[T]he defendants introduced expert testimony that was supported by a uniform
body of evidence including epidemiological studies failing to establish a causal link
between silicone breast implants and connective tissue disease . . . . Hence, the
district court could reasonably conclude that reasonable people could not differ as to
the import of the epidemiological evidence.”); Pozefsky v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
92-CV-0314 (LEK)(RWS), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11813, at *20 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 16,
2001) (“Because Plaintiff has failed to establish the scientific reliability of his theories
on causation and the overwhelming weight of scientific authority to the contrary, the
Court will join these courts and exclude the testimony of [Plaintiff’s expert] as to the
causation of Plaintiff’s alleged [systemic] condition by her silicone breast implants.”).
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were ever offered.
These sorts of distinctions, of course, are exactly what Rule 702
requires: courts must determine whether expert instruction “is the
71
product of reliable principles and methods.”
For factual
generalizations about the nature of the world, our touchstone is the
scientific method of observation, experimentation, and replication.
How proficient courts are at applying these principles is another
question.
Occasionally, they exclude plausible but unproven
generalizations (for example, that exposure to PCBs promotes small
cell lung cancer).
More often, courts admit unreliable
generalizations because they are accustomed to evidence of that
72
sort—handwriting expertise, for example —or because the witness
has impressive professional credentials—a Ph.D. (like Louise
73
Robbins ) or an M.D.
(b) Norms
A different kind of instructional information concerns the
norms of a field—typically, customs and standards of care. In a
malpractice suit, for example, a witness may testify about the
appropriate standard of care for treatment of asthma in infants,
offering instructional expertise. These claims are also empirical—the
witness is describing the custom of the field, her opinion about what
is done in ordinary practice—but the empirical facts they concern are
socially created. The expert’s task is not to describe the best
treatment for a condition, but rather the standard treatment. Ideally,
the latter will conform to the former, but not immediately, not
always, and not everywhere.
Outside of litigation, this category of expert information is
comparatively unimportant, except to the extent that it is used in less
formal attempts to assign responsibility or blame. In torts cases
involving professionals, however—doctors, lawyers, accountants,
psychotherapists—these instructional opinions are often the heart of
the case, the key testimony on the key legal question. Because the
content of professional norms is central to malpractice litigation,
factual information about these norms is essential. Because this
information concerns social norms rather than natural facts, it is
treated differently from other types of expert instruction.
The only essential requirement for an expert on the norms of a
community is, obviously, familiarity with that community and its
71
72
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behavior. This prerequisite mirrors the knowledge that is required of
a translator, except that in this context, the expert must be familiar
with the customs and practices of the culture (or subculture) rather
than its language. Accordingly, in court, the only requirement for an
expert witness who testifies about professional norms is that she
qualify as an expert in that profession.
Any competent
endocrinologist can offer opinions about the ordinary and acceptable
practice of endocrinologists, and any experienced criminal defense
attorney can talk about the norms of her profession.
Note that the ultimate question in cases involving standards of
care or custom is Frye-like: What is the generally accepted practice of a
given community? Here however, the “general acceptability” of a
practice is a question for the trier of fact, not a foundational
requirement for admissibility. Since the content of the norm is the
question for the jury—and perhaps also because the issue is so
thoroughly one of social norms—we are willing to admit even
idiosyncratic opinions about community norms, so long as these
idiosyncratic opinions come from bona fide members of the relevant
community. The key for determining admissibility is the speaker,
rather than the substance of what is spoken; we evaluate
qualifications, rather than the validity of the content of the testimony.
There are, of course, subsidiary issues. How close must the fit be
between qualifications and the question at issue? Should a nonspecialist physician be able to testify about the custom of a particular
medical specialty? Should a family practitioner be allowed to testify
about the standard of care in a case involving high-risk obstetrics?
Should a properly trained physician who no longer sees patients be
allowed to testify about treatment norms? Courts have generally
treated these issues as going to weight rather than admissibility, but at
some point, a mismatch between the expert’s experience and the
norms about which she is testifying may become so glaring that
exclusion is appropriate.
As always, bias is an important issue for instructional expert
testimony about standards and customs. Two kinds of bias are of
particular concern. First, there is partisanship—the bias of the
professional expert who may be all too willing, consciously or
unconsciously, to tailor her testimony to suit her client’s needs.
Second, there may be a problem of professional solidarity—a
tendency to avoid criticism of colleagues. Even if they have no
personal relationship, one physician may be reluctant to testify
against another, either out of a sense of professional camaraderie, or
because the witness recognizes that the mistake the defendant made
was one that the witness could well have made herself. In addition,
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there is the general problem of hindsight bias: it may be too easy
after the event to criticize actions that were in fact reasonable in light
of what was known at the time. All of these issues of bias typically are
understood to affect the weight of the evidence but not its
admissibility.
Daubert and its progeny have had little effect on this kind of
instructional testimony. While physicians’ evidence about causation
74
in toxic torts cases has been curtailed in the last decade, physicians’
testimony about standards of care remains substantially unchanged.
This lack of substantive scrutiny seems largely appropriate since there
is no external standard by which to evaluate evidence on the norms
and practices of a social group. For the same reason, however, courts
should scrutinize the fit between the speaker’s experience and the
community about which she speaks. Of course, requiring too close a
fit may heighten the danger of bias.
If only Charlottesville
cardiovascular surgeons can testify about the proper standard of care
for a triple-bypass operation in Charlottesville, we might be
concerned that the only qualified witnesses would be biased in favor
of the defendant because of local professional and community ties; a
concern for fit should not be used as an argument for resurrecting
the locality rule in medical malpractice cases. On the other hand, it
seems reasonable to require that the witness practice cardiovascular
surgery somewhere. So long as professional communities are defined
on a national basis, it ought to be possible to require a close fit for an
expert who testifies on professional norms without unduly limiting
the pool of potential witnesses.
3. Assessment
When we hire an expert, an architect, or a surgeon, we usually
want them to do things for us. One of the most important things we
may want them to do is make decisions—where to build, whether to
operate—or at least to make specific recommendations. Other than
doing the tasks themselves, that is the central function of experts: to
provide specific, concrete advice on what course of action to take.
Their most conspicuous function in court is much the same, but in a
context in which that sort of advice is otherwise prohibited.
Perhaps the most basic distinction in American trials is between
the job of the witness and that of the trier of fact. These are the only
two absolutely essential speaking roles in court. The parties typically
only speak as witnesses, and we can and often do conduct trials
74

On the transformation of standards for proving causation, see Finley, supra
note 16, and Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 16.
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entirely without lawyers. But there can be no trial without someone
to provide evidence and someone to judge it. At ancient common
law, these functions might merge: jurors were sometimes selected
because they knew the circumstances of the case. We now require
strict separation. Jurors and judges evaluate evidence, but do not
produce it. They may only consider information about the case that
they hear from witnesses in court; they may not be witnesses
75
themselves; and if they know too much about the facts from extrarecord sources, they may not be allowed to serve at all. On the other
side, witnesses are supposed to present information, not evaluate it.
76
77
They are limited by the personal knowledge and lay opinion rules
to testimony about matters they perceived (“I saw two men cross the
street”), and to low level descriptive inferences based directly on their
own perceptions (“The older-looking man was speaking very
quickly”).
Except for experts. Expert witnesses are not subject to the
personal knowledge rule or the lay opinion rule. They are allowed to
make wide-ranging evaluations based on many types of evidence, firstand second-hand, admissible and inadmissible; they may express
opinions on the precise factual issues the judge or jury must decide;
they may evaluate the entire body of evidence before the court and
tell the trier of fact what decision to reach. These case-specific
evaluations, applying background knowledge and expert skill to the
facts at hand, are what we call “assessments.” In many cases expert
assessments take the form of judgments that can be adopted directly
by the trier of fact: “The accident was caused by faulty wiring in the
fuselage,” or “the defendant is the biological father of the minor
child.” For some claims, expert assessments are required as elements
of proof.
Because of their power and importance, expert assessments have
received a great deal of attention. They are the visible high-end of
expert evidence. For just that reason, we devote relatively little space
to them. Our main agenda is to explore types of expert evidence that
have received insufficient attention, and this one does not qualify.
Quite the opposite: We could not begin to do justice to the range of
assessments that are offered by expert witnesses, or to the vast
literature discussing them. Instead, we will offer a set of observations
that connect expert assessments to the other types of expert
evidence—observation and instruction—that we have already
75

See FED. R. EVID. 605 (prohibiting judges from testifying as witnesses); FED. R.
EVID. 606 (prohibiting jurors from testifying as witnesses).
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FED. R. EVID. 602.
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discussed. Indeed, we have already discussed expert assessments
themselves, to some extent, to point out the distinctions between
assessment and observation or instruction, and the overlaps between
them.
78
We use a medical malpractice case, Zuchowicz v. United States, to
illustrate a common and important type of expert assessment and to
raise two issues that we will talk about briefly: (1) the relationship
between assessments and other types of expert evidence, and (2) the
treatment of expert assessments that are not based on “science.”
While our discussion focuses primarily on assessments of causation,
much of the analysis is applicable to the other kinds of assessment in
our taxonomy as well.
(a) Assessments and other types of expert evidence
The plaintiff in Zuchowicz developed the rare disease Primary
Pulmonary Hypertension (PPH) shortly after a naval pharmacy
instructed her to take over twice the maximum daily dose of the drug
79
Danocrine.
The United States as defendant conceded that its
doctors and/or pharmacists had been negligent, and that the
plaintiff died from this disease. The only triable issues were
causation—did the overdose of Danocrine cause Mrs. Zuchowicz’s
PPH?—and damages. The district court, sitting without a jury,
80
granted judgment to the plaintiff, and the Second Circuit affirmed.
Most of the factual discussion in the Second Circuit opinion is
based on expert evidence, although the court does not always seem to
be aware of this. We are told that starting in late February 1989,
Mrs. Zuchowicz took the 1600 milligrams of Danocrine each day
for the next month. Thereafter, from March 24 until May 30, she
took 800 milligrams per day. While taking Danocrine she
experienced abnormal weight gain, bloating, edema, hot flashes,
night sweats, a racing heart, chest pains, dizziness, headaches,
81
acne, and fatigue.

The symptoms discussed in this section could have been described by
lay observers. Undoubtedly, most of the information (hot flashes,
night sweats, headaches, dizziness, etc.) originally came from
statements by the deceased plaintiff herself. In practice, however, it is
likely that all of these symptoms were described in court by experts,
the testifying physicians, and mostly on the basis of reports from
78

140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 383.
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Zuchowicz v. United States, 870 F. Supp. 15 (D. Conn. 1994), aff’d, 140 F.3d
381 (2d Cir. 1998).
81
Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 384.
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other physicians or nurses. Certainly few patients would describe a
symptom they experience as “edema.” We are then told that:
In October 1989, [Mrs. Zuchowicz] was diagnosed with primary
pulmonary hypertension (“PPH”), a rare and fatal disease in
which increased pressure in an individual’s pulmonary artery
causes severe strain on the right side of the heart. At the time she
was diagnosed with the disease, the median life expectancy for
PPH sufferers was 2.5 years. Treatments included calcium
82
channel blockers and heart and lung transplantation.

Most of this section is expert instruction: the nature of PPH, the
fact that it is rare, a patient’s life expectancy after diagnosis, and
standard treatments. The initial statement, however, is an expert
assessment: that the plaintiff was diagnosed as suffering from PPH. In
the context of this case, it is not controversial, but it is an expert
assessment of her condition all the same. Inevitably, it will have been
based in part on expert observations—blood pressure measurements,
perhaps other tests—by the testifying witnesses or (more likely) by
other experts, that may or may not have been described in court.
The opinion next proceeds to a detailed discussion of the PPH:
Pulmonary hypertension is categorized as “primary” when it
occurs in the absence of other heart or lung diseases.
“Secondary” pulmonary hypertension is diagnosed when the
hypertension results from another heart or lung disease, such as
emphysema or blood clots. PPH is very rare. A National Institute
of Health registry recorded only 197 cases of PPH from the
mid-1980s until 1992. It occurs predominantly in young women.
Exogenous agents known to be capable of causing PPH include
birth control pills, some appetite suppressants, chemotherapy
drugs, rapeseed oil, and L-Tryptophan.
According to the district court’s findings of fact, the disease
involves the interplay of the inner layers of the pulmonary blood
vessels known as the endothelium and the vascular smooth
muscle. The endothelium releases substances called vasodilators
and vasoconstrictors, which dilate and constrict the blood
83
vessels.

The court goes on to present the current theory of the cause of
PPH: “If too many vasoconstrictors are released, the blood vessels
82

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 384-85 (internal citations omitted). In the context of this case, the
instructional testimony about the causal relation between PPH and other drugs was
uncontroverted, part of the generally accepted background information about the
condition. If one of these other causal relations were at issue in the case, what was
taken as true in Zuchowicz might instead have been challenged as insufficiently
established.
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contract, the endothelial cells die, and the vascular smooth muscle
cells proliferate. These actions create increased pulmonary vascular
84
resistance.” All of this, of course, is based on expert instruction,
which continued in the court’s discussion of the drug at issue,
Danocrine:
According to the testimony of plaintiff’s expert Dr. W. Paul
D’Mowski, who personally performed much of the initial research
on the drug, Danocrine is safe and effective when administered
properly.
Based on studies by Dr. D’Mowski and others,
Danocrine was approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) for use in dosages not to exceed 800 mg/day. Mrs.
Zuchowicz was accidentally given a prescription instructing her to
take twice this amount—1600 mg/day.
According to Dr.
D’Mowski no formal studies of the effects of Danocrine at such
high doses have been performed, and very, very few women have
85
received doses this high in any setting.

This too is expert instruction, and like everything above it,
uncontroversial, at least in this case. With all that now on the table,
the dispute is narrowed to the two last points the plaintiff must prove:
“(a) that defendant’s act in giving Mrs. Zuchowicz Danocrine was the
source of her illness and death, and (b) that it was not just the
Danocrine, but its negligent overdose that led to Mrs. Zuchowicz’s
86
demise.”
After the discussions of PPH and Danocrine, the opinion turns
to a new section entitled “The Expert Testimony” and describes in
detail the testimony of two expert witnesses for the plaintiff, a
87
The
professor of medicine and a professor of pharmacology.
heading is telling, and misleading. Most of the opinion up to this
point is based on expert testimony; one of the experts (Dr.
D’Mowski) is even named. What distinguishes the issues discussed
under the heading “The Expert Testimony” from those discussed
above it is that they are in dispute; they define the question the court
must answer: did the plaintiff adequately prove causation? This is a
difficult, perhaps unanswerable question; it is the focus of the case.
But the context of the question is at least equally important; the
issues have been narrowed to that one question, and the court has
learnt a great deal about what is generally known (or believed) about
Danocrine and PPH. All of this is the product of expert testimony.
And what was included in the evidence labeled “Expert
84
85
86
87

Id. at 385.
Id.
Id. at 389.
Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 385.

2003

A PRELIMINARY TAXONOMY

181

Testimony”? Two critical items:
Dr. Matthay testified that he was confident to a reasonable
medical certainty that the Danocrine caused Mrs. Zuchowicz’s
PPH. When pressed, he added that he believed the overdose of
88
Danocrine to have been responsible for the disease.
....
Dr. Tackett testified that, to a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty, he believed that the overdose of Danocrine, more likely
89
than not, caused PPH in the plaintiff . . . .

The court then proceeds to describe the mechanisms by which,
according to Dr. Tackett, Danocrine probably caused the plaintiff’s
illness and death.
These are expert assessments of the most ambitious sort. Drs.
Matthay and Tackett each testified, in effect, “If I were judge, I’d find
for the plaintiff on the issue of causation.” Like any other layperson
who consults an expert, the trial judge was free to disregard this
advice. In fact—although it is not relevant to the Second Circuit
opinion—the defendant almost certainly presented other experts
90
who said the opposite. A plaintiff, however, is required to present
expert evidence of this sort to meet her burden of proof in a medical
91
malpractice case, and if it is accepted by the trier of fact, she wins.
In this case, as always, the expert assessments were built on a
foundation of expert description and instruction. Much of that was
uncontroversial: Mrs. Zuchowicz’s medical history, the nature of PPH,
etc. But each of the doctors also relied, implicitly if not explicitly, on
two general factual claims that were controversial: that Danocrine can
cause PPH, and that an overdose of Danocrine increases the chances
92
of developing PPH. Those propositions were as necessary a step in
their reasoning as the parallel claim in Daubert that Bendectin can
cause birth defects. To the extent that they were discussed explicitly,
that too was expert instruction: testimony designed to persuade the
trier of fact on an issue of general application.

88

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 386.
90
The trial court’s opinion mentioned one of the defendant’s experts in passing,
noting that this expert acknowledged one of the plaintiff’s experts to be an expert in
pulmonary hypertension. Zuchowicz, 870 F. Supp. at 18.
91
See Aspiazu v. Orgera, 535 A.2d 338, 342 (Conn. 1987); Shelnitz v. Greenberg,
509 A.2d 1023, 1027 (Conn. 1986). Aspiazu was cited in Zuchowicz by the Second
Circuit, 140 F.3d at 389, and by the trial court, 870 F. Supp. at 16.
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If the plaintiff would have been equally likely to get PPH if she had received
the proper dose, then the pharmacy’s negligence would not have been the cause of
her illness.
89

182

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34:141

(b) Nonscientific assessments
In Daubert, the Court noted that while Rule 702 applies to all
expert testimony, “[o]ur discussion is limited to the scientific context
93
because that is the nature of the expertise offered here.” That left
open the question of whether Daubert applies to nonscientific
expertise. In Kumho Tire, the Court said Yes: “We conclude that
Daubert’s general holding—setting forth the trial judge’s general
“gatekeeping” obligation—applies not only to testimony based on
‘scientific’ knowledge, but also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and
94
‘other specialized’ knowledge.” This holding left open the question
of how this general gatekeeping obligation should be carried out for
nonscientific expertise, an issue that the Court begins to address in
Kumho Tire itself, and that has attracted a great deal of attention
since.
We start with a different question: Why is the expert testimony
that was excluded in Daubert described as “scientific” (or at least,
would-be scientific) evidence, and the expert testimony that was
excluded in Kumho Tire as “nonscientific” evidence? The evidence at
issue in Daubert, as we know, was testimony by several qualified
95
medical experts “that Bendectin can cause birth defects.”
The
evidence in Kumho Tire was testimony by a qualified engineer with
experience as a tire failure consultant, that “a defect in its
manufacture or design caused the blow-out” that led to the accident
96
that was the basis for the lawsuit.
What makes the evidence in
Daubert “science” and that in Kumho Tire “nonscience”? The
distinction does not reflect a difference in the scientific bases of the
two disciplines at issue. As the Court notes in Kumho Tire,
“[e]ngineering testimony rests upon scientific foundations . . .”;
97
arguably, engineering is at least as scientific as medicine.
The difference, rather, is the nature of the issue the experts
addressed. The question in Daubert was general causation: Can this
drug ever have the claimed effect? Because it is a general issue it
could be, and, as it happens, had been, systematically studied. The
question in Kumho Tire was the specific historical cause of a single
accident: Why did this tire blow out when it did? Science may
provide us with tools (microscopes, reagents, etc.) to help answer that
question by examining the remains, but the actual event cannot be

93
94
95
96
97

509 U.S. at 590 n.8.
526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
509 U.S. at 583.
526 U.S. at 143.
Id. at 150.
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replicated and studied systematically. The main factual issue in
Daubert was what to make of the thirty published epidemiological
studies that had failed to find a relationship between Bendectin and
birth defects. That issue—in our terminology, a question of fact
instruction—is properly in the sphere of science. The factual
question in Kumho Tire was “whether the expert could reliably
determine the cause of this tire’s separation” on the basis of visual
98
inspection of the tire in question. That question—an issue of expert
assessment—was a matter for practical judgment.
There’s an irony here. Although the “nonscientific” expertise in
Kumho Tire came from an engineer, there is no doubt that the bulk of
similar testimony comes from medical experts, the same category of
witnesses who provided some of the prohibited “scientific” evidence
in Daubert. A majority of all witnesses in American trials are medical
99
professionals—M.D.’s alone make up half of the total —who testify
primarily in personal injury trials of one sort or another. The most
common role for a medical witness is to offer an expert assessment of
the medical status of an individual—her condition (diagnosis), or its
causes, or her future prospects (prognosis). These assessments are
often nonscientific, practical clinical judgments in the same way that
the engineer’s testimony in Kumho Tire was nonscientific. The
disputed expert testimony in Zuchowicz is a good illustration.
As the Second Circuit points out, the nature of the issue of
causation in Zuchowicz essentially precluded scientific evidence on
causation:
The rarity of PPH, combined with the fact that so few human
beings have ever received such a high dose of Danocrine,
obviously impacted on the manner in which the plaintiff could
prove causation. The number of persons who received this type
of overdose was simply too small for the plaintiff to be able to
provide epidemiological, or even anecdotal, evidence linking PPH
100
to Danocrine overdoses.

Instead, one of the plaintiff’s experts, Dr. Tackett, offered a causal
hypothesis: “Danocrine, more likely than not, caused PPH in the
plaintiff by producing: 1) a decrease in estrogen; 2)
hyperinsulinemia, in which abnormally high levels of insulin circulate
in the body; and 3) increases in free testosterone and
101
progesterone.”
The conclusion of Dr. Matthay, the plaintiff’s
98
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second expert on causation, “was based on the temporal relationship
between the overdose and the start of the disease and the differential
102
etiology method of excluding other possible causes.”
There may be nothing wrong with Dr. Tackett’s hypothesis, but
that’s all it is—an untested hypothesis. The hypothesis itself was quite
103
possibly reasonable, and if Dr. Tackett had said that this was a
possible cause of Mrs. Zuchowicz’s illness, that would have been a
plausible scientific statement. Instead, he testified “to a reasonable
degree of scientific certainty” that it was “more likely than not” that
this theoretical process had the effect he hypothesized, and, even
more specifically, that it was more likely than not that the overdose
104
caused the disease. This language may have been necessary to meet
the substantive legal requirements of the plaintiff’s malpractice claim,
but asserting, with that level of confidence, that an untested
hypothesis is true in general, and explains a particular event, is not
science. Dr. Tackett inferred too much on the basis of too little.
Dr. Matthay’s testimony sticks closer to an accepted expert
methodology: differential diagnosis. But it too is not science.
Treating physicians must make judgments about the nature and
causes of their patients’ pathologies even when they only have limited
information, just as judges and juries must make decisions about
disputed facts. In the process, doctors (like courts) gather the best
information they can—scientific and nonscientific—consider the
range of plausible theories, and try to exclude as many as possible.
This is probably the best they can do. It may have been reasonable,
for example, to conclude that an overdose of Danocrine might have
caused Mrs. Zuchowicz’s PPH. That may have been the best educated
guess a treating physician could produce; it may have justified a
therapeutic decision. But in the absence of any other evidence that
Danocrine has ever had this effect, the temporal coincidence
between the overdose and the disease in this one case cannot justify a
high degree of certainty that the former caused the latter. Dr.
Matthay’s testimony—like much medical testimony based on sound
clinical medicine—is far closer to the “nonscientific” expertise in
Kumho Tire than to the “scientific” expert evidence in Daubert. But
the problem with this testimony, insofar as there is one, is not that it
is not science; it is, once again, the excessive confidence with which
102

Id.
As the trial court notes, another one of the plaintiff’s experts deemed the
theory “very plausible.” Zuchowicz, 870 F. Supp. at 20. Obviously questions of
partisan solidarity—a form of bias—arise when assessing the weight due to
corroboration by another expert testifying for the same side.
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the expert’s assessment is pronounced.
The expert testimony in Zuchowicz was controversial because of
the unanswered underlying question of general causation: Can
Danocrine, or an overdose of Danocrine, ever cause PPH? This
question—a matter that is subject of general expert instruction—is of
the sort than could in theory be studied and answered scientifically,
although in this instance that might be exceedingly difficult. The
district court admitted the testimony over objection, and the circuit
court affirmed, essentially on the theory that the plaintiff was
presenting the best expert testimony available. Given the discretion
conferred by the Supreme Court in Joiner, a different trial court could
105
have done the opposite and also have been affirmed. In Joiner itself,
for example, the trial court excluded specific expert assessments that
exposure to PCBs promoted the plaintiff’s lung cancer for lack of
evidence on general causation: “Plaintiffs have failed to show by a
preponderance of proof that their experts’ opinions regarding the
PCB/lung cancer link are admissible under the standards set out in
106
Rule 702 and explicated in Daubert.”
In many cases, there is no dispute about general causation.
Everybody agrees that exposure to asbestos can cause lung cancer.
But did asbestos cause the lung cancer that killed a particular
plaintiff—a fifty-eight year-old worker, for example, who was exposed
to a moderate amount of asbestos and who smoked a pack of
cigarettes a day since the age of 16? In that situation the only
disputed issue is one of clinical judgment. In the usual case, each
side will present one or more qualified doctors who will testify that
asbestos did or did not cause the disease, and the opposing party will
not even bother to object.
We do not mean to say that assessments of specific causation are
inherently “nonscientific.” The terminology is the Supreme Court’s,
not ours. In some cases the cause of a person’s disease can be
determined with a high degree of confidence. Extensive studies have
shown that the vast majority, if not all cases of mesothelioma—a rare
cancer of the lining of the chest, abdominal cavity, or heart—are
caused by exposure to asbestos. Given that body of “scientific”
105

There are no other reported cases regarding a causal relation between
Danocrine and PPH. For an example of a disputed issue of causation on which
courts are currently reaching contradictory conclusions about admissibility under
Daubert, see Mark Hansen, “When Expert Testimony Fails the Test: District Courts Disagree
on what Defines Causation Evidence in Drug Disability Cases,” 88 A.B.A. J. 22 (2002)
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knowledge, an expert could assert with a high degree of confidence
that the mesothelioma suffered by a particular patient was caused by
exposure to asbestos. And advances in science may improve the
ability of experts to determine the cause of a patient’s illness in
harder cases. New tests could perhaps be developed that will detect
subtle morphological differences between lung cancer caused by
asbestos and lung cancer caused by smoking. Our point rather is that
doctors and other experts must regularly make judgments of this sort
with limited information. When experts render opinions in the face
of great uncertainty, we should recognize both their expertise and its
limits.
In our culture, science is the dominant method for answering
general factual questions: Does the consumption of trans-fatty acids
increase the risk of heart disease? Can earthquakes be predicted by
observing the behavior of animals? What is the relationship between
confidence and accuracy for eyewitness identifications of strangers?
Does Bendectin cause birth defects? When experts claim to be able
to address these questions—to provide general factual instruction—
courts should require an appropriate relation between the evidence
supporting their claim and the degree of confidence asserted. In
many cases the best scientific answer is uncertainty: It’s likely, it’s
possible, it’s plausible, it’s unlikely—but in any event, we don’t know.
The capacity to recognize and acknowledge uncertainty and to
postpone judgment is an essential element of scientific inquiry. This
is a luxury that does not extend to trials, however, or to any other
situation in which decisions about particular cases must be made.
Doctor, engineers, investigators, judges and juries all must decide
how to act on particular facts in the face uncertainty. There is
nothing illegitimate about a doctor’s decision to recommend
radiation treatment instead of chemotherapy to a cancer patient,
even though an equally competent colleague down the hall would
have done the opposite. Scientific studies may frame the issue and
narrow the options, but if they do not provide a clear answer to a
question that cannot be put off the doctor will have to do her best by
other means: rely on anecdotal data, reason by analogy, or play a
hunch. By the same token, it makes perfect sense for courts to listen
to expert evidence about specific factual assessments—the diagnosis
of a patient’s disease or the cause of an accident—even though
assessments are not in themselves scientific statements. If similar
assessments are used to decide how to treat patients or design tires,
courts should be willing to listen.
From a scientific point of view, the main danger of specific
assessments based on limited information is overconfidence. To
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some extent, this danger may be inherent in the process of making
decisions, especially difficult and important ones: those of us who are
not plagued by self-doubt tend to become committed to our choices,
however arbitrary. A doctor who prefers radiation to chemotherapy
for idiosyncratic reasons may come to believe, and tell others, that it
is far superior. The use of partisan experts magnifies this effect.
Lawyers are likely to encourage their expert witnesses to talk in
strong, unambiguous terms and to choose those experts who are
likely to do so anyway or willing to take direction. The oncologist
who says the plaintiff’s lung cancer was “clearly caused by asbestos”
may be hired by the plaintiff; the one who says it was “clearly caused
by smoking” may be hired by the defendant; but the doctor who says
“it looks like ____, but it’s hard to tell” will never appear in court,
regardless of how he fills in the blank. In addition, as we have seen,
the substantive law governing the claim may provide an additional
push for the expert to testify that a theory that is reasonable and
plausible, but utterly uncertain, is “more likely than not” “to a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty.”
IV. CONCLUSION
American evidence law consists primarily of objections to the
admission of evidence, so most judicial and academic discussions of
expert evidence focus on admissibility. In the wake of Daubert, the
central issues have been the validity of expert evidence, and to a
lesser degree the competence of expert witnesses—both of which can
pose problems for admissibility—rather than the bias of expert
witnesses or the clarity of their testimony, which are almost always
said to go to the weight of the evidence. This is a narrow point of
view. For most uses of expert evidence, across topics and fields,
admissibility is not a problem. The great majority of experts who are
called are deemed competent to testify—“qualified”—without
opposition. Many types of expert evidence are routinely admitted
without explicit consideration of their validity; and in the uncommon
cases in which the validity of expert testimony is genuinely disputed,
exclusion is often not the best remedy.
We have tried to explore the entire assorted range of expert
evidence that is offered in court, and the full range of issues it
presents, by developing a taxonomy of expert information. We hope
this scheme has some value; we know that it is a preliminary and
incomplete effort. For the most part, we give a descriptive account of
those uses of expert evidence that we discuss. We do, however, have a
few general recommendations. We do not mean to imply that these
ideas are original, or that courts do not (sometimes) act on them.
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We intend rather to salute those who do and encourage those who as
yet do not.
First, attend in detail to the content of expert evidence. Expert
witnesses may make many different types of statements. Their
testimony will frequently blend observation, description and
assessment. Even when part of their testimony is insufficiently
reliable, other portions may be admissible. Most qualified experts
who are called at trial probably have something to say that the jury
should be allowed to hear, even if it is not everything the proponent
wants to offer. In deciding on the admissibility of expert evidence,
courts should focus on the actual statements the experts intend to
make, and exclude only those that are for one reason or another
inadmissible, rather than thinking of the expert’s testimony as a unit
that stands or falls in its entirety. And in evaluating expert evidence
that is before them, courts should likewise focus on the separate
statements rather than the testimony as a whole, and make use of
what is reliable and valuable.
Second, pay special attention to the level of confidence the expert
witness expresses. In Daubert itself the problem was categorical. By
1989, the claim that Bendectin causes human birth defects was simply
bad science: there had been “more than 30 published studies involving
over 130,000 patients,” none of which “demonstrated a statistically
107
significant association between Bendectin and birth defects.”
To
assert the opposite, given the strength of the available evidence, was
simply not scientifically plausible. More often, however, the real
problem with questionable expert testimony is less extreme, that the
expert witness has expressed an unjustified degree of confidence. In
Zuchowicz, for example, it would have been perfectly reasonable to
conclude that the plaintiff’s primary pulmonary hypertension might
have been caused by an overdose of Danocrine. That would not have
been a scientific conclusion—there was too much uncertainty to justify
a confident conclusion about causation—but it would have been a
plausible hypothesis, a clinical judgment on which a doctor or perhaps
even a court might reasonably act, especially given the lack of better
information. Unfortunately, the informational value of that sort of
hypothesis in court is often degraded when it is described as a fact, or
even when it is said to be “probable” or “likely” for no better reason
than that the party calling the expert would like that statement to be
heard. What could be modest but useful expert evaluation is
transformed into misleading pseudo-science.
All of us—doctors, lawyers, teachers, judges—are prone to
107
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exaggerate. It would be reassuring if this tendency were mitigated in
the solemn precincts of our courts, if witnesses and advocates spoke
with unusually measured care. For experts at least, the truth is
probably exactly the opposite. Confidence and certainty are traits
that lawyers seek when they choose experts—and traits they try to
instill as they prepare them for trial—because they are understood to
be effective. Worse, in many cases substantive rules of law require
expert witnesses to phrase their testimony in terms of a specified level
of confidence. It is no accident that Dr. Tackett testified “to a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty” that it was “more likely than
not” that Mrs. Zuchowicz’s death was caused by an overdose of
Danocrine; he was required to do so. It may be perfectly reasonable
for courts to decide as a matter of law some questions that turn on
expert evidence, and to take those issues—or the entire cases—away
from the jury. But there is nothing to be gained from rules that
distort the evidence that goes into the process, or that require
talismanic language that creates special incentives for experts to
exaggerate. The experts we call as witnesses will provide better
information if we do not encourage them to speak with excessive
confidence in order to be heard at all. After they are heard, it may
make sense to reject the claims they address by finding insufficient
evidence in support as a matter of law—but that judgment should be
made on the basis of the best expert evidence we can get, not the
most pliable.
Finally, look after the adversarial system. We insist on using
partisan, adversarial expertise in court almost exclusively. There are
other ways to make use of expert information in litigation—perhaps
better ones—but this is ours. As long as we do depend on the
adversarial system, we need to have one that actually is what it claims
to be: a contest with two sides, where each serves as a check on the
other. In many criminal cases, there is only one side on expert issues:
the prosecution. The result is a national scandal. We have seen case
after case of systematic fraud and incompetence by prosecution
experts and police crime laboratories, with no end in sight. Daubert
and the cases following it were civil cases; the problems they address
limit the efficiency of our system of civil litigation, and may result in
erroneous judgments at trials where money damages are at stake.
The abuses that have been discovered in the use of experts in
criminal prosecutions call into question the integrity of our system of
determining the guilt or innocence for the most serious crimes, and
have produced false convictions that have destroyed the lives of many
innocent defendants.

